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Abstract- Energy detection is best suited for the detection of licensed users when prior knowledge about 
them is unavailable. However, the presence of noise uncertainty refrains the use of energy detection for 
spectrum sensing. In this paper, we propose a refined energy detection (RED) which used dual 
threshold in the presence of noise uncertainty, and combine the concepts from game theory to achieve 
further performance improvements. The secondary user payoff is defined based on the primary user 
activity and the strategy adopted by the secondary user. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium and the 
best response for the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium are analyzed for all the possible strategies 
adopted by the secondary user. Simulations results show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in 
terms of greater secondary user payoff and robustness against noise uncertainty.   
 
Index terms: Cognitive Radio, Spectrum sensing, Energy Detection, Noise Uncertainty, Game Theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent studies on wireless spectrum demonstrate that the wireless communication systems suffer 
from inefficient spectrum usage in the licensed portions of the spectrum [1]. Reformation in the 
existing spectrum assignment policies is essential such that the new policy schemes would allow 
opportunistic use of the licensed spectrum by the unlicensed users. Cognitive Radio (CR) offers a 
promising solution to overcome the inefficient spectrum usage problem and anticipated to make 
this policy reformation successful. The licensed users are referred as primary users and the 
unlicensed users as secondary users in the context of CR. 
CRs are devices that can alter its parameters based on the dynamically changing environment and 
opportunistically occupy the licensed spectrum without causing interference to the incumbent [2]. 
The fundamental task called spectrum sensing enables the CR to identify the idle portions of the 
primary spectrum.  Spectrum sensing algorithms should be efficient to identify the idle portions 
accurately. Moreover, reliable spectrum sensing is highly challenging in the presence of noise 
uncertainty. A review of literature presents a number of spectrum sensing algorithms. Energy 
detection [3], matched filtering [4], cyclostationary feature detection [5], covariance based 
detection [6], Eigen value based detection [7], detection using wavelets [8] and filter bank 
spectrum estimation [9] are few among them. The performance of the existing spectrum sensing 
algorithms provide trade-offs between detection accuracy, computational complexity and sensing 
time. But their practical applicability depends very much on the information available about the 
primary signals. Energy detection is the most preferred approach for spectrum sensing when the 
CR is unable to gather sufficient information about the primary user signals.  
Originally, the energy detector is proposed for the detection of an unknown deterministic signal 
considering a flat band-limited Gaussian channel [10]. In the last decade, the energy detector 
proposed in [10] is being used for spectrum sensing to a large extend because of its simplicity 
and low computational complexity. Analytical and simulated performance analysis of energy 
detection for AWGN and fading channel models and various improved versions of energy 
detectors can be found in [11-14]. There are several contributions in which the spectrum sensing 
algorithms are analyzed under noise uncertainty [15 -18].  In [15], the authors describe the 
existence of SNR wall below which detection performance cannot be obtained effectively. The 
performance of energy detection under Log Normal approximation of noise uncertainty is 
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analyzed in [16]. The authors of [17] assume a uniform distribution for noise uncertainty and 
analyzed the performance of energy detection. A generalized energy detector is analyzed under 
noise uncertainty in [18] and observed that the traditional energy detector (TED) is best suited for 
spectrum sensing under noise uncertainty. An optimized and improved energy detection 
algorithm can be found in [19]. Issues related to the future of spectrum sensing are covered in 
[20].  
On the other hand, cooperative spectrum sensing is proposed to enhance the sensing performance 
of the secondary users [21].  There are numerous contributions which employ evolutionary game 
theory for cooperative spectrum sensing [22-23]. The authors of [22] present the spectrum 
sensing as an evolutionary game and develop a model for whether and when to share the sensing 
results for cooperative spectrum sensing. A distributed spectrum sensing game using evolutionary 
theory is designed for CR with heterogeneous traffic [23]. Another spectrum sensing model is 
formulated as an evolutionary game to study the selfish behaviour of the secondary users [24]. 
Most of the contributions based on game theory take advantage of cooperative spectrum sensing 
to achieve performance enhancements. In addition to spectrum sensing, other CR related issues 
such as spectrum sharing, spectrum access, security concerns are modelled using game theory 
[25-27].   
In this paper, we first propose a refined energy detection (RED) algorithm for spectrum sensing 
which is superior to the TED. The RED algorithm uses an arbitrary positive p instead of squaring 
to compute the decision metric and also takes advantage of the past history of decision metric to 
improve the detection performance.  Then we extend the RED algorithm suitable for spectrum 
sensing under noise uncertainty by incorporating a dual threshold and using game theory 
principles. The Bayesian belief update algorithm is employed to study the spectrum occupancy 
records from the past statistics. We observe significant performance improvements in terms of 
greater secondary user payoffs and low probability of error. The major contributions addressed in 
this paper are thus summarized: 
1. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first attempt to use the game theory 
based decision making for spectrum sensing in the presence of noise uncertainty.  
2. First, the detection probability and false alarm probability of the proposed RED is 
derived. The optimum value of p maximizing the detection probability is identified.  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON SMART SENSING AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS VOL. 10, NO. 1, MARCH  2017 
148
3. The performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed in terms of the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) and compared with the existing schemes. The total 
probability of sensing error and the sample complexity is analyzed against varying 
SNR.  
4. A dual threshold is employed for the RED algorithm under noise uncertainty. 
Concepts from game theory are used to arrive at a decision. The best response is 
analysed for all the strategies played by the secondary user based on the primary user 
availability. The secondary user payoff is evaluated and compared for both with and 
without noise uncertainty.    
 
II. SPECTRUM SENSING PRELIMINARIES 
 
The CR spectrum sensing can be formulated as a binary hypothesis testing problem as follows.     
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where H0 is the hypothesis denoting the absence of the primary user and H1 is the hypothesis 
denoting the presence of the primary user. y(n) is the signal received by the secondary user, w(n) 
is the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) of variance 2
w   and s(n) is the primary user 
signal with variance 2w and assumed to be real Gaussian. Moreover, s(n) and w(n) are assumed to 
be independent of each other. The TED uses squaring operation to compute the decision statistic, 
given by 
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where Y is the decision statistic and N is the number of samples used for computation. Y is 
compared with a pre-evaluated threshold . IfY  , the decision is H1, otherwise H0. Ideally any 
spectrum sensing algorithm should select H0 when the primary user is absent and H1 when it is 
present. Practically, spectrum sensing algorithms are prone to errors which are classified as 
missed detections and false alarms. A missed detection occurs when the spectrum sensing 
outcome is H0 and the primary signal is present. On the other hand, a false alarm occurs when the 
spectrum sensing outcome is H1 and the primary signal is absent. A missed detection causes 
K. Muthumeenakshi and S. Radha, SPECTRUM SENSING IN COGNITIVE RADIOS UNDER NOISE UNCERTAINTY: 
DECISION MAKING USING GAME THEORY
149
harmful interference to the primary user whereas false alarm results in loss of transmission 
opportunities to the secondary user. The sensing errors are usually represented by the following 
conditional probabilities, the probability of missed detection, 
0 1Prob( / )mdP H H and the 
probability of false alarm, 1 0Prob( / )fP H H . The complementary probability of missed 
detection is the probability of detection given by
1 1Prob( / ) 1d mdP H H P   . It is desirable to 
have large Pd and low Pf for any spectrum sensing algorithm. However, there exists a trade-off 
between the two values. To depict the relationship between the two values, ROC curves are 
useful. The ROC of the TED algorithm is given by [14], 
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where,    1 22 / 1f wNQ P   .  
The TED has well-known detection performance drawbacks and its performance depends on 
factors like SNR, N and  . To enhance the performance of the TED algorithm, we propose the 
RED algorithm which is explained in the following section. 
 
III. REFINED ENERGY DETECTION ALGORITHM FOR SPECTRUM SENSING 
 
The enhanced energy detector (EED) proposed in [14] makes use of an arbitrary positive power p 
to compute the test statistic instead of squaring operation. The modified decision statistic of the 
improved energy detector Ym with p
th power summer is given by, 
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where 
m  is the modified decision threshold. For any p, ( )
p
y n are independent and identically 
distributed random variables. Using [14], the mean and variance of ( )
p
y n  is given by, 
Under H0: 
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As the random variables ( )
p
y n follow normal distribution [14], the modified test statistic also 
follows normal distribution with mean and variance values given by, 
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The Pd and Pf of the improved energy detector is given by [14], 
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IV. THE RED ALGORITHM  AND THE OPERATING PRINCIPLE 
 
Based on the modified decision statistic EED given by (4), the proposed RED algorithm is 
explained as follows. At every ith sensing instant, imY is computed and compared with m which is 
evaluated based on Pf. If Ym > m , then the decision is hypothesis H1. If Ym falls below m, 
additionally a comparison with the average decision statistic of the past L sensing instants avg j
m
Y  
and the decision statistic of the previous sensing instant 1imY
 is performed with 
m . If both the 
values exceeds 
m , the decision is hypothesis H1. Otherwise, the sensing outcome is hypothesis 
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H0. This additional check helps to avoid any false alarms due to instantaneous signal energy 
drops [12].   The average signal energy of the past L sensing instants is computed as, 
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As the test statistic values of the past instants j = i, i-1, …i-L are assumed to follow normally 
distribution, their average decision statistic also follow normal distribution as given by, 
avg j
m avg avg
Y Normal μ σ~ ( , )
 
The average mean and variance of avg j
m
Y  can be evaluated as [12], 
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where M is the number of times the primary user is actually present out of the past L sensing 
instant. From the secondary user point of view, the value of M depend upon the sensing outcomes 
and may not correspond to the actual presence/absence of the primary user. Without the exact 
knowledge of M , the performance of the RED algorithm is difficult to predict, but the upper and 
lower bounds corresponding to M = 0 and M = L can be analyzed. The probability of detection of 
the RED algorithm r
dP  is given by, 
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The corresponding false alarm probability 
r
fP   is given by,  
                                               1
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The probabilities of detection and false alarm of the RED algorithm are bounded by 
22rd d d dP P P P    and 
22rf f f fP P P P   as the value of Q function lies between 0 and 1. This 
shows that the detection probability of the RED is lower bounded by the detection probability of 
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the EED. The degradation in false alarm probability is also observed from (17). As the 
probabilities depend on the value of p, it is possible to find an optimum p which maximizes 
22rf f f fP P P P   , (i.e) 
                                                
* arg max rd
p
p P                                (18) 
The solution for (18) is obtained numerically as it is difficult to obtain its solution in closed form. 
It is found that the p* depends on N, SNR and Pf.  Thus p
* can be computed offline for various 
values of SNR, N and Pf. For practical sensing, for a given N, Pf and the estimated SNR, p
* can be 
chosen from the offline computed values. The RED algorithm is summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. RED Algorithm 
 
for every sensing instant i do 
       Compute Ym 
       Compute avg 
j
m
Y  
       Choose p* using N, SNR and Pf 
            if 
i
mY > m

, then 
             decide H1 
           else 
                if 
avg j
m
Y
> m

 and 
1i
mY

> m

, then 
                    decide H1 
                else 
                    decide H0 
                end if 
           end if 
 end for 
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V. RED ALGORITHM UNDER NOISE UNCERTAINTY 
In this section, we describe the game theory based decision making technique for the secondary 
user in the presence of noise uncertainty. The threshold obtained using (11) directly depends on 
the noise power 2
w which is difficult to estimate accurately. Practically, the average noise power 
2
w  is known and it is different from the actual noise power 
2
w .  The noise power changes with 
time and location and is therefore uncertain. We assume the noise power uncertainty to be 
uniformly distributed in the interval [17] as given by, 
                                           
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where   is the factor describing the noise uncertainty. Under noise uncertainty,  >1. If noise 
uncertainty is absent,  =1. Noise uncertainty is can also be expressed in dB, denoted as del = 
1010log  . To enhance the performance of the energy detector under this environment, a dual 
threshold is used as described by, 
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where u
m , 
l
m  are the upper and lower thresholds, 
NU
0
u , NU0
u are the mean values of the RED 
decision statistic for the upper and lower extremes of the noise uncertainty  given by, 
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Using (22) and (23), the decision regarding the presence or absence of the primary user is 
obtained as explained below. The RED decision statistic is compared with the upper and lower 
thresholds. If it exceeds um , the decision is H1. If it falls below 
u
m , the decision is H0. If it falls in 
between the two threshold, the secondary user choose any of the three options (i.e.,) sense again, 
decide H1, decide H0. he block diagram of the proposed RED algorithm is shown in Figure.1. 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON SMART SENSING AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS VOL. 10, NO. 1, MARCH  2017 
154
Based on the strategies, a dynamic game is formulated and explained in detail in the following 
section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 1    Block diagram of the proposed RED algorithm 
  
 
VI. DECISION MAKING USING GAME THEORY 
 
The secondary user spectrum sensing is formulated as a decision making problem when the 
algorithm decision statistic falls in between the upper and lower thresholds. The primary user is 
the incumbent and has the right to use its spectrum when it desires. Thus the primary user is 
either ON or OFF based on its state of requirement. On the other hand, the secondary user’s 
intention is use the primary spectrum to the maximum without violating the spectrum etiquette. 
The secondary user is uncertain about the primary user ON-OFF activity pattern. Let the 
probability that the primary is in the ON state be p1. The actions taken by the primary user is 
from its strategy space Ap = {access, don’t access}.  The secondary user chooses its actions from 
the strategy space As = {sense, access, silent}. The payoff for the primary user is always the 
spectrum gain irrespective of the secondary user’s move. The payoff matrix of the secondary user 
corresponding to any particular game stage is shown in Table 2. We define the following 
notations to formulate the secondary user payoff matrix [10]. 
G – denotes the spectrum gain. For example, the spectrum gain is the bandwidth attained by the 
secondary user. 
    
    
u
l u
l
Y
Y
Y

 


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Decision making 
using game theory 
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sense again 
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Cs – denotes the sensing cost. It applies to the secondary user if it decides to sense the spectrum 
when the spectrum is actually occupied. For example, the cost refers to the energy consumed by 
the secondary user for sensing. 
P – denotes the penalty incurred by the secondary user when it causes interference to the primary 
user. For example, the secondary user may be forbidden to use the spectrum for a particular 
amount of time. 
R – denotes the reward for the secondary user and it applies if it does not cause interference to the 
primary user. 
We assume that the relationship between the parameters follow P > G > Cs and R > Cs. The 
reasons behind the constraints are as follows: 
P > G: The interference caused to the primary user is highly unacceptable. This constraint 
ensures that the secondary user would not access the spectrum to avoid interference to the 
primary user.  
G > Cs: This is the constraint which ensures that the secondary user gains incentives for spectrum 
access. Otherwise, the secondary user will be reluctant to use the spectrum if the additional 
sensing cost exceeds the spectrum gain. 
R > Cs: The reason behind this constraint is to assure that the secondary user gain incentives for a 
correct decision.  
 
Table 2: Secondary user payoff matrix 
Secondary User Primary User ON (p1) Primary User OFF(1- p1) 
Sense R - Cs -G + Cs 
Access -P + G G 
Silent R -G 
 
The payoff matrix is analyzed for the two cases namely, the primary user if ON and OFF. When 
the primary user is ON, the secondary user gets a reward R if it chooses silent. Alternatively, if it 
chooses to sense it incurs a sensing cost Cs in addition to the reward R. Hence, the overall payoff 
is R – Cs for this case. If the secondary user chooses to access the spectrum, it gets a penalty P for 
interfering with the primary user besides gaining the spectrum. In this case, the overall payoff is –
P + G. When the primary user is OFF, the secondary user gains the spectrum if it chooses to 
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access with the payoff G. If it chooses to be silent, it loses the free spectrum with a payoff of –G.  
On the other hand, if it chooses to sense, in addition to spectrum loss it incurs positive sensing 
cost and the total payoff is –G+Cs. The sensing cost is positive because when the primary user is 
OFF, additional sensing may result in a positive decision for the secondary user. 
 
a. Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium analysis  
 
A specific action that the player will follow in every possible attainable situation is defined as  
pure strategy. In game theory context, a particular strategy '
is of player i is strictly dominated than 
his other strategy si if, 
   ' , ,i i i i i iu s s u s s   
And weakly dominated if,   
   ' , ,i i i i i iu s s u s s   
where 
 ,iu    refer to the payoff of the player i. A two player game has unique pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium if each player has a dominant strategy [27]. 
The primary user has the highest priority as has the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium as spectrum 
gain. Thus, we analyze the Nash equilibrium for the secondary user.  
Lemma 1: As the primary user does not maintain one particular state (OFF or ON), pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium does not exist for the secondary user. 
Proof: Table 1 shows that the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the secondary user is choosing 
silent when the primary user is ON. For the second case when the primary user is OFF, the pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium for the secondary user is choosing access. As the primary user does not 
maintain a single state, the game will not converge to unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for 
the player. Thus, we analyze the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for the secondary user. 
 
b. Mixed Strategy Nash equilibrium analysis  
 
The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is investigated by assigning probabilities to the pure 
strategy space which refers to how frequency each pure strategy is played. Here the game is a 
single player decision making process and hence we define the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
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based on the probability of the primary user being ON. The mixed strategy space of the 
secondary user is defined as {sense, access, silent}. The choice of the mixed strategy such that 
the secondary user attains a best response is analyzed.  
Lemma 2: The existence of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is identified in this game if, the 
secondary user choose access if 1
2
2( )
s
s
G C
p
R P G C


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, choose sense if 
1
2 1
2( ) 2
s
s
G C
p
R P G C

 
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and choose silent if 
1
1
2
p  . 
Proof: The game tree for a single game stage is shown in Figure.3 for the secondary user. The 
expected payoff for the secondary user can be calculated as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 3 Game tree showing all possible actions for the secondary user 
 
The expected secondary user payoff for all the actions in the space As is given by, 
                                              1 1 1[ , ] 1s sE sense p p R C p G C                                         (24) 
                                             1 1 1[ , ] 1E access p p P p R                                    (25) 
                                             1 1 1[ , ] 1E silent p p R p G                                       (26) 
It should be noted that the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium can be found by finding the best 
response for the secondary user as a function of probability of primary user being ON.  
It can be readily obtained from the plot of the payoff function given by (24), (25) and (26) as 
shown in Figure.4. To find the best response, the primary user ON probability is obtained at the 
two relevant intersections. 
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Figure. 4    Expected secondary user payoff against p1 
Equating (24) and (25), 
         1 1 1 11  = 1s sp R C p G C p P p R         
1
2
2( )
s
s
G C
p
R P G C


    
Equating (24) and (26), 
         1 1 1 11 1s sp R p G p R C p G C          
1
1
2
p 
. 
The best response (BR) for the secondary user is thus given by, 
                                          
1
1
1
2
access  if 
2( )
2 1
sense if 
2( ) 2
1
silent  if 
2
s
s
s
s
G C
p
R P G C
G C
BR p
R P G C
p

   

 
  
  



                                       (27) 
In practice, the value of p1 is unknown to the secondary user. In order to find its strategy, the 
secondary should develop a model to estimate the value of p1 from the past statistics. We use the 
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basic Bayesian belief update algorithm with weighted coefficients to estimate the probability of 
primary user being ON [27]. The Bayesian belief update with weighted coefficients to update the 
belief of secondary user during any jth stage is given by, 
                                     
   
       
1 1
1 01 1
(ON)
1 1
r r
d dj j
j r r r r
d d f fj j j j
w P
p
w P w P

 

  

 
                             (28) 
where  
1
r
d j
P

and  
1
r
f j
P

 is the detection and false alarm probability obtained using RED 
algorithm at the (j-1)th sensing instant,  rd j and  
r
f j
 is the detection and false alarm 
probability obtained for RED algorithm with noise uncertainty obtained using the upper 
threshold. w0 and w1 are the weighing factors to highlight the priority of primary user activity. If 
the secondary user decides that the primary user is ON due to noise uncertainty, then it loses the 
spectrum or additionally it may incur sensing cost if it chooses to sense. Therefore, it loses a total 
of G + Cs. Conversely, if it decides that the primary user is OFF, the secondary user may incur a 
total loss of G + P. Based on these factors, the weighing factors can be defined as, 
                                                        1
2 s
P G
w
P G C


 
                                                     (28) 
                                                        0
2
s
s
C G
w
P G C


 
                                                     (29) 
Thus the strategy for the secondary user can be set based on its own belief about the primary user. 
To summarize, the actions taken by the secondary user are given as follows: 
For the primary user, 
 If there is a need to transmit, then access the spectrum.  
 The probability of being ON for the primary user is p1 and being OFF is 1-p1. 
For the secondary user, 
 If there is a need to transmit, 
 Sense the spectrum and compute the decision statistic Y. 
 If Y > u, then access the spectrum. The payoff is E(s) =  G 
 If Y < l, wait for the next sensing event. The payoff is E(s) =  R 
 If l < Ym < u , The payoff is given by Equations (10-12) with p1 = 1
jp .  
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IV.  SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
In this section, first the theoretical and simulated results of RED algorithm are presented. Then 
the simulated results of the RED algorithm with noise uncertainty are presented. Simulated 
results are obtained using Matlab with 100000 Monte Carlo iterations.  
First the optimum p is identified for the RED algorithm. Then the ROC performance of the RED 
algorithm for the optimum p is compared with the existing algorithms. Then the total error 
probability (Pmd + Pf) and the sample complexity of the RED algorithm against SNR is obtained 
numerically and compared with existing algorithms.  Finally, the expected payoff for the 
secondary user is analyzed for varying probability of primary user being ON and the efficacy of 
the proposed decision making under noise uncertainty is justified. 
 
a. Identifying optimum value of p 
 
In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we obtain the curve of Pd against p for the RED and TED algorithms. It is 
observed for the TED algorithm that there exists a maximum Pd for a particular value of p. This is 
the optimum p which improves the detection performance for the given Pf, N and SNR. Similarly, 
a global maximum value is observed for Pd for the RED algorithm and it is greater than the TED 
algorithm. The optimal p also depends on the past observations (i.e), the number of times the 
primary signal is actually present M. This is due to the fact that the average mean and variance is 
a direct function of M.  
Thus it can be concluded that the incorporating the past observations with TED greatly improve 
the detection performance. Figure. 5 and Figure. 6 also show that the optimum value of p 
depends on the value of Pf. 
To illustrate the benefit of the operator ‘p’ in the RED algorithm, we evaluate the optimum p for 
varying Pf. As seen from Figure. 7, the optimum p is different for varying Pf. It declines as the 
false alarm rate increases. Thus the optimum value of p can be stored as an offline table for 
various spectrum sensing parameters such as SNR, Pf, and N. Based on the requirement, a perfect 
choice for p can be obtained quickly from the table and sensing can be performed. 
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Figure.5  Pd against p for Pf = 0.1, N = 1000 & SNR = -10dB 
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Figure.6  Pd against p for Pf = 0.01, N = 1000 & SNR = -10dB 
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Figure.7  Optimum p against Pf, N = 1000 & SNR = -10dB 
 
b. ROC performance of the RED Algorithm  
 
Figure. 8 and Figure. 9 show the ROC characteristics for the proposed and the existing 
algorithms.  
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Figure. 8 ROC curves for Pf = 0.1, N = 1000, SNR = -10dB  & M =0, L=10 
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. The ROC curves are obtained using (3), (11), (12), (16) and (17) with Pf = 0.1, SNR = -10dB, 
N=1000 and M = [0, L].  As it is appreciated, the performance is upper bounded by the RED 
algorithm. We also consider the IED is the improved energy detection algorithm proposed in [12] 
for comparison.  When M=0, the IED performance coincides with TED because the sensing 
outcome is mostly based on the current sensing event. But an improved performance is obtained 
for the same with optimal p using RED. As M increases, errors caused due to misdetections are 
avoided resulting in an improved performance. For any M, the RED performance is found to be 
superior.   
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Figure. 9 ROC curves for Pf = 0.1, N = 1000, SNR = -10dB  & M =L=10. 
 
c. SNR Performance of the RED Algorithm 
 
The total error probability is observed against SNR in Figure. 10 and Figure. 11 for optimal p, M 
= [0, L] and fixed Pf, N. For M = 0, the error probability obtained using RED is less for low SNR 
values and matches with IED and TED as SNR increases. As M > 0, the error probability of RED 
is the least over the entire range of observed SNR. This is because IED algorithm suffers from 
significant false alarm degradation.  
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Figure. 10 Probability of error against SNR for Pf = 0.1, N = 1000, SNR = -10dB  M =0 & L=10 
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Figure. 11 Probability of error against SNR for Pf = 0.1, N = 1000, SNR = -10dB  &  M =L =10 
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Figure. 12 Number of Samples against SNR for Pf = 0.1, Pd = 0.1,  N = 1000 
  
In Figure. 12, the number of samples required for all the three algorithms is observed against 
SNR for a target Pd and Pf. For TED, the sample complexity is determined easily using eq (3), 
whereas for IED and RED it is obtained numerically. It is great to note that the proposed RED 
method requires less number of samples over IED and TED algorithms.  
 
d. RED Algorithm under noise uncertainty 
 
In this section, we conduct numerical analysis and express the secondary user payoff over game 
stages. The parameters used the game theory analysis are assumed as follows: P = 100, R = 100, 
G = 50 and Cs = 20. The following probability values are assumed for the primary user activity, 
p1= 0.05, 0.2, 0.35 and 0.5. The secondary user is not aware of these actual values and hence start 
with an initial value of p1 = 0.5. As the game progresses, the secondary user updates its belief. 
Initially, we study the secondary user payoff under various noise uncertainty factors and compare 
with the TED algorithm.   Figure. 13 and Figure. 14 show the secondary user average payoff per 
stage for the RED algorithm averaged over 100 game stages for del = 0.1 and 0.2 respectively. 
For comparison, the constant payoff obtained using TED algorithm is considered. As illustrated, 
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the proposed game theory based RED algorithm achiever larger payoff even in the presence of 
noise uncertainty.   
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Figure. 13 Secondary user average payoff per stage for del = 0.1 dB 
(Pf = 0.1, N = 1000, SNR = -10dB) 
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Figure. 14 Secondary user average payoff per stage for del = 0.2 dB 
(Pf = 0.1, N = 1000, SNR = -10dB) 
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Next, the average secondary user payoff obtained over 100 stages for increasing probability of 
primary user being ON (p1) is shown in Figure, 15.  
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Figure. 15 Secondary user average payoff per stage against probability of primary user being ON 
(Pf = 0.01, N = 1000, SNR = -10dB, del = 0.1 dB) 
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Figure. 16 Secondary user average payoff per stage against probability of false alarm 
(p1= 0.5, N = 1000, SNR = -10dB, del = 0.5 dB) 
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The decrease in the average payoff against p1 is evident as the increase in the primary user being 
ON will offer less spectral opportunities for the secondary user. Finally, we show that for 
increasing false alarm probability, the average secondary user payoff initially increases and 
becomes approximately constant in Figure. 16.  This is because for low values of false alarm, the 
detection probability is also low and increases with increasing false alarm probability as evident 
from the ROC performance.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, a RED algorithm is proposed for spectrum sensing to enhance the performance of 
sensing accuracy. First, the probability of detection and false alarm of the proposed RED 
algorithm is derived. The optimal value of p which maximizes the detection performance is 
identified. The ROC performance, sensing error and sample complexity against SNR of the RED 
algorithm are observed and found to outperform the existing algorithms. Then the RED algorithm 
is extended for improving the sensing performance against noise uncertainty. A dynamic game is 
formulated between the primary user and the secondary user in which the primary user has the 
highest priority. Secondary user sensing strategies are devised when it is unable to make a hard 
decision regarding the state of the primary user. The expected secondary user payoff is calculated 
taking into account the actions played by the secondary user. The probability of choosing a 
particular strategy such that the secondary user payoff is maximized is analyzed. The Bayesian 
based belief update algorithm with weighted coefficients is used to build a decision about the 
state of the primary user. Simulation results validate the efficacy of the proposed RED algorithm 
and found to be superior over the existing schemes in terms of ROC, greater secondary user 
payoff and better robustness against noise uncertainty.  
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